



## “LA JRIC”<sup>1</sup>

### The Los Angeles Police Department and the Global War on Terror

#### The Executive Sponsor as Community Capability Builder

Captain Gary Williams was in the hunt for partners. In the aftermath of the September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on Washington and New York, the LAPD faced a steady stream of reports and information about threats. “I was in charge of what was then the LAPD’s Antiterrorist Division,” Williams recalled, “and we were overwhelmed. Very quickly I determined that this was not the way to do business.”

The intelligence community at the time was deeply siloed – “all in their own little basket,” as Williams characterized it. Although some cross-jurisdiction task forces existed, for the most part there was little dialogue – whether across agencies, or even within the LAPD. “They weren’t talking to one another,” Williams observed, “and I include us in that, also – we weren’t taking in information from our *own* department, let alone others”

Much of the problem seemed inherent in history, organization, and culture. FBI field offices, for example, were like fiefdoms – “franchises,” in the words of one LA region veteran – whose agents-in-charge watched the flow of information in and out their offices carefully. Criminal investigators – whether Federal or state – who wanted to make cases that could be prosecuted and won were often at odds with intelligence officers who wanted to pursue leads and never reveal sources that might be exposed by courtroom testimony. Strategic analysts concentrated on putting dots together, but the tactical demands of cases often pressed analysts into service on day-to-day investigations. And then there was the problem of clearances: few state or local officers had the top secret clearances necessary for access to Federal data. Few analysts stayed in the position long enough, as analysis within law enforcement organizations often had no career track to speak of. Turnover was high, as young analysts left the discipline to seek career advancement within police organizations as investigators.

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With so many obstacles to sharing, most information exchange was on a “who-you-know” basis. “In the intelligence business, it’s relationships that cause information to move back and forth,” Williams observed. “It’s not about technology – though you need technology to make analysis and information flow more efficiently.” But in the steeply fortified world of the American intelligence and enforcement communities, relationships were the key to crossing the divide. They could be hard to make and hold. “You basically did the best you could with what information you could get.”

The consequences could range from trivial, to ridiculous, to disastrous. In Glendale, for example, not long after the 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, Williams recalled that the Glendale city officials received a report of a possible bomb planted at a large business high-rise. They decided to evacuate the building, causing disruption and expense. The information turned out to be false. The incident highlighted the need to Williams and others to find a better way to gather, analyze and use the stream of information now coming in over the transom to the Los Angeles region’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“It was obvious to me that there was a need for some time of collaboration,” Williams said. “We needed a regionalized effort to make quick sense of threats, determine their credibility, disseminate some type of product whether verbal or written, and give policymakers and decision makers the best information available to make operational decisions.”

It was a deadly serious business. “Los Angeles was described as next to New York and Washington the most likely terrorist target in the country,” Bill Bratton explained. In 2002, Bratton would become LAPD’s Chief of Police. “It had been attacked before. It had been the subject of planned attacks. It had a significant potential to be attacked again because of so many things – the port, the airport, the entertainment industry, the large Jewish population. There was clearly going to be a need to do a better job of defending it.”

Using existing LAPD funds and staffs, in 2002 the LAPD established a joint Terrorist Threat Assessment Center (“TTAC”), making arrangements with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the FBI to share information. LAPD established a threat line for public access, and soon a steady stream of threat information arrived. Although it was self-funded and thinly staffed, TTAC anointed a concerted effort to consolidate and rationalize the treatment of data that was streaming into LAPD. In turn, TTAC provided “intelligence products” -- threat assessments -- on upcoming events, everything from the LA marathon to the Oscars, as well as bulletins to educate field officers on suspicious activities and related matters.

The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department pursued its own tack, consolidating fire, health, epidemiology and other “first responders” in the region in to its Terrorist Early

Warning Group (“TEW”) to consider threat and response to possible chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. Such threat reports were numerous, and as there was little local police experience in evaluating such cataclysmic threats or incidents, consolidating the region’s aftermath groups seemed like a positive development. “Nobody on the police side had the expertise, at least locally, to determine, whether these were really legitimate threats,” recalled Williams. “If it’s in fact a real threat, could somebody actually do this stuff, technically? The TEW folks have some expertise on all of those issues.”

Federal efforts gained momentum over this same period – whether through existing groups such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”), or the new Department of Homeland Security. It became obvious to Williams and others that some greater collaboration framework was needed to consolidate all the activity – the data, response, and resources – that was now beginning to trip over large and unexplored leads – and each other.

“We had at the time a huge case at LAPD in which there was probably close to two hundred people being evaluated -- all based on one small report from an apartment house manager who saw what she thought was suspicious activity. And indeed, it was suspicious activity. Two or three people who were residents of her apartment building who were seen celebrating after 9/11, who had changed their mode of dress from very traditional Middle Eastern garb to very American garb. They lived in stark conditions –no furniture to speak of – and were doing suspicious things with their vehicle, in terms of taking the license plates off, switching vehicles, clandestine meetings, and the like. It doesn’t necessarily mean it was criminal, but it was suspicious activity. Someone had to go out and investigate it.”

Williams’ group took up the matter, liaised with the FBI for background information, and began surveillances; observing what they deemed “very, very suspicious activities” that triggered alarms. Eventually the matter mushroomed to involve over 200 subjects and to span two years.

It was extremely demanding of resources. “It was obvious,” Williams said, “that, there were insufficient personnel and resources to do the information analysis which creates the intelligence to get the job done. We needed to share more, and share better – resources, money, people, information, and technology.”

It was especially true as many in law enforcement had learned that, as Williams observed, “all terrorism is local.” “It’s local in response, because it always happens in a city, so cities have to be prepared to deal with it. And the formation of the attack is also always local at some point, so, eyes and ears on the street from a policing point of view are critical to prevent it.”

Williams and Mike Grossman of the Sheriff's Department began knocking on doors in the law enforcement and intelligence communities. They were offered a patchwork of contributions – some desk-space here, some investigators there. What disturbed Williams most of all was not none of it seemed to scale correctly to the problem – or the needed response.

“This really needed a larger collaboration than we ever anticipated when we began,” he said. “It wasn't just about the agencies -- we had to include our infrastructure community like power, gas, and banking. We needed more people, we needed more equipment, and we needed more resources. We needed more of everything.”

But by the end of 2002, there was no money, and little wherewithal to do more than the informal data sharing among the agencies that Williams, Grossman at the Sheriff's Department, and the FBI had managed to cobble together. Williams and Grossman made numerous regional and national visits, seeking support and resource. Through fits and starts they gained attention, some commitments, and development. But for the most part the vision lay dormant

In late 2002, William Bratton arrived in Los Angeles as its new Chief of Police. John Miller, a trusted aide from Bratton's days east in New York, arrived shortly after, taking up duties as Assistant Chief in charge of the Department's principal counter-terrorism units – its bomb squad, hazardous materials units, critical infrastructure protection units, and Williams' own anti-terrorist division.

Bratton found the LAPD not yet prepared to address the new demands. “There was a very small counter terrorism entity here,” Bratton said, “and it was quite obvious more was going to need to be done. The capability was too small to meet what I felt was going to be the growing need.”

Bratton quickly moved to consolidate the LAPD's counter terrorism units into a single command, and to establish Miller as the Assistant Chief in charge. Bratton waged a not-always successful campaign to move resources into the Command, facing City Council opposition, and ultimately electing to assign personnel over and above the formal budget authorization. “That,” Bratton explains, “is a choice I make to continue to prioritize this as an issue. It is needed.”

Bratton's choice of Miller was controversial. As a former journalist and public affairs specialist for Bratton when he served as Commissioner of the New York Police Department, Miller raised eyebrows as to his expertise. But Bratton believed strongly that John Miller was the right person, right job, and right time.

“He had written about and had a deep understanding of this issue. He was passionate to return to service as so many personal friends had died as a result of the

World Trade Center attacks. As I did, he wanted to return to the public sector where he could do something about.”

“He not only had passion,” Bratton continued. “He had expertise, knowledge and management capabilities, and that was going to be critical. He had done what was always very difficult as an outsider, and particularly a civilian outsider – the ability to commit to a new organization and quickly get accepted, assimilated, and respected. His vision was quite clearly, to the best of our capabilities, to defend this city against the potential for terrorist attack, and he was focused very heavily on the critical need to gather intelligence to prevent attacks, rather than focus on responding to a disaster that has already occurred. This is a region of the country that was very good at disaster preparedness and response, but in dealing with terrorism, the real secret is to prevent it in the first place.”

“My style,” Bratton concluded, “is to embrace the idea, find the right people to do it, point them in the direction, open doors when necessary to support it with staffing and limited funding, and leave it to the people under me – give them a free hand -- to make it happen. I felt confident that John would succeed.”

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“I was very fortunate to have John Miller as my boss,” Williams recalled. It did not start off easy. Williams importuned Miller to consider his ideas for a regional information sharing center. ““Why do we want *that*?”” Williams recalls Miller asking. “I told him, ‘Whatever we do here it needs to be an “all-hazards, all-crime” approach. Looking at all of the picture,” Williams asserted, “helps with you any *piece* of it. It all ties in with terrorism, and terrorism ties into it.”

World-wide counter terrorism officials knew this to be true – that perpetrators of terrorist acts fund their operations with the proceeds of ordinary crime. The Madrid railway bombers, for example, had financed their attacks with drug dealing, counterfeiting, and credit card fraud, and Miller knew it. Williams’ argument to go beyond terrorism – to look across crimes in narcotics, to surface unexpected connections to terrorism plots in the making – resonated. “We have got to delve into what we do not know, and see what the connections are,” Williams argued, “Otherwise we will simply see what we already know.” Miller bought it.

So, too, did Bratton. “The link between local crime and global terrorism has now become an accepted principle in the business that may not have been accepted earlier on,” Bratton observed. “There is now a willingness on the part of the Federal government to get the locals involved on the premise that the intelligence they are going to need was in fact going to be initially information that we have. They need access to it,” Bratton explained, “but they also need our analysis of it.”

John Miller understood the complexity of the challenge that lay ahead. “Gary Williams looked out across this landscape of targeted, boutique-like operations, each collecting its own ‘dots,’ and said, ‘Yes, we are putting the pieces together and sharing that,’ Miller recalled. “‘But it is not the same as pouring all of our dots into one bucket, then pouring them all out on the table and connecting them together. What we had is a bunch of boutiques. What we really needed was a department store.’”

And as Bratton and Miller came on the scene, the Los Angeles region was awash with such boutiques. The FBI post-9/11 transformation included establishing “FIGS”, or Field Intelligence Groups, in each of its 56 field offices. For the first time, a single group was collecting intelligence across *all* FBI programs -- criminal, terrorism, and espionage, among them. The LA County Sheriffs’ Department operated TEW, which brought together the “consequence” managers. The LAPD “boutique” -- the TTAC -- focused on intelligence analysis and product. There was also the “JDIG”, or Joint Drug Intelligence Group, which was a FBI-led DEA-HIDA operation gathering intelligence and coordinate large scale narcotics cases and target organizations. There was *so* much criss-crossing activity that, at least for narcotics work, the region’s enforcement organizations established “LA Clear” as a “deconfliction” center to map all ongoing cases, so as to avoid “blue-on-blue” incidents – instances in which investigators might inadvertently buy and sell drugs to or from each other, or work the same cases and targets.

“There were a number of things in place out here that showed that there was a willingness to cooperate and share information,” Bill Bratton observed. “It was a matter of then creating a consensus that we needed something similar to this for terrorism.”

Bratton, for his part, had been hard at work building bridges throughout the region. This had not always been the tradition of LAPD chiefs.

“The LA culture here could be summed up in one word,” Bratton explained. “That was ‘isolation’. The Department had handled itself over the years in a way that really isolated it from a lot of the surrounding cities and town. It was, ‘The LA way or no way.’”

“From my first day here,” Bratton continued, “I really worked hard to go to chief’s meeting, to cooperate as much as possible with the different chiefs, certainly with the LA County Sheriff. They would indicate to a person if asked that there has been much more openness to sharing what we are doing.”

In the weeks and months ahead, Bratton’s bridge-building would prove invaluable. For with the “dots” still stuck inside the fortresses, Miller said, “we began to implement Gary’s concept that we needed a Joint Regional Intelligence Center that would pour the dots on the table and connect them up.”

## Next Moves

Chief Bratton authorized using a \$1 million narcotics grant to seed the effort. For the first time, Williams' concept had backing.

Still, said Miller, "We knew that even with a million bucks, we do not have enough to rent office space, we do not have enough to get our computers in it, and we do not have enough to do anything, really." Partnership was called for, and Miller and Williams began a most cautious dance with the FBI and the LA County Sheriff.

Certainly, the JRIC would need facilities, and staff. But above all, it would need data. FBI systems information was critical for deep insight into criminal and intelligence matters. And Miller knew that reports from any of the regions' 50 chiefs of police were vital, too.

"LA County is a county of eighty-eight cities and towns, forty-four of whom are policed by the Sheriffs Department, but the other forty-four of whom have their own police departments and their own police chiefs and their own detectives and they are going to need access to this information and they are going to need to have input into this information. Because if a cop in Culver City makes the car stop and finds three guys from Tora Bora with the blueprints to the Staple Center in the back seat and a story that does not match up -- if that intelligence does not get to this information center, then we are missing a piece that is important"

Yet as they envisioned sharing governance, operations, and administration, partnerships with these old "friends" looked risky. It was one thing to stand off and control one's own destiny. It was another to cast one's lot entirely in an untested partnership.

"We fully understood that we would be a significant player and the 800-pound gorilla out here," Bratton observed. "So there was a concern about it in the sense of having this be seen as an LAPD project. That was not what we were looking for. It was in keeping with the whole idea of partnership, not just on terrorism, but on dealing with crime."

"The FBI meant well but didn't quite have the same vision," Williams observed. "The FBI is the FBI, and they run their own world. They're very headquarters-centric, and they march to the headquarters beat. Back then, at the time," Williams said,

“headquarters did not have a clue about what was needed from state and local governments in terms of dealing with terrorism.”

Partnership with the Sheriff had its own issues. “The sheriff is the “go to” guy on first response issues for all hazards, which includes a terrorist attack. But that office did not have the intelligence expertise,” Williams said. “Like the NYPD, we’ve been in business since the early fifties, and were deep into those relationships.”

Miller had concrete choices to make, and none looked appealing. “I could throw all my eggs in the FBI basket, and figure well, if I give them a big fat commitment, I can kind of tap into their resources. But on the other hand they would be running the show.”

Williams urged caution on Miller. “Once you give up the bodies, you give up control of the bodies,” Miller recalls Williams warning. “We may not always want to go the same way as the FBI in a given case. The FBI looks at things through an FBI prism, and may have one view. Sometimes we look at the same things from the local prism and another view. Neither one has to be right, but we should be able to follow our instincts.”

Alternatively, Miller considered giving LAPD detectives over to the Sheriff’s TEW to help TEW build more intelligence capacity. But with the sheriff pressed for resources, might he not take the LAPD gift of detectives, and pull his own deputies to assign them where he was short-staffed? “The TEW might not get any bigger really,” Miller mused. “We couldn’t be sure, but we might just be contributing to yet another resource where we weren’t in control.”

Miller found that the FBI and the Sheriff’s department were each eager to partner – and it startled neither Williams nor Miller to learn that both seemed quite interested on bringing LAPD’s resources – and the JRIC -- into their domains.

“When we started this process,” Miller said, “we came up with a concept paper and we approached the Sheriffs’ office with it. They immediately looked at it and said, “This is a great idea, and we’ll run it.” We said, ‘Well, actually, we were thinking maybe that you *wouldn’t* run it.’ They could not pay for it, and might take our resources and kind of channel them into their thing. Then we approached the FBI and said we want to do this thing and want you to be in it and they said, “Well, yeah, we will partner up with you, in fact *we* should run the thing.”

Miller and Williams kept shopping. They considered a third option: LA Clear, run by the Los Angeles County Association of Chiefs of Police in partnership with the LA County Sheriff. The facility was already operating to map narcotics and organized crime cases and track them, and had the computers to do it. It had training facilities, a wire

room to operate multiple wiretaps and surveillances – most of the infrastructure the JRIC concept required needed. And while it occurred to Miller that LA Clear was quite interested to acquire JRIC and the LAPD’s \$1 million seed money to reposition itself into the counter-terrorism funding stream just as the narcotics funding stream was drying up, it was all perfectly understandable. “They had a high interest in getting us in their space, and we had a high interest in their space, too, because it was free, and our funds wouldn’t go far on the outside.”

The FBI was cordial and offered some analysts to JRIC if it went into LA Clear. But when Miller asked, “And what about FBI systems?” the answer came back, “No.” The LA Clear facility was not secure – or “scif”<sup>2</sup> – to the secret or top-secret level. People, yes. Systems, no.

Without FBI systems running in with intelligence from overseas, and access to their classified data, Williams cautioned Miller the whole effort would be pointless – a “Mickey Mouse Club without the secret decoder rings.” Ron Iden, the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office, understood. He told Miller he knew it needed FBI systems, that it needed to be an FBI-lead effort or at least in an FBI space, so that staff could be designated into security clearances on a task force basis, overtime addressed, and other real-world requirements satisfied. There was only one problem: the FBI’s Los Angeles office neither had the space, nor the money, to deliver.

Miller was stumped. He had a great offer from Iden, but no resources to make it happen. He had a great offer from LA Clear, but without the FBI, it looked hollow. “We knew we were not really going to get the classified data in there.”

But then Iden called back. “Maureen Baginski,” he said. “Do you know who she is?”

Maureen Baginski had spent her entire career at the National Security Agency as a Russian specialist before coming over to the FBI to establish an intelligence directorate at the Bureau. She was now its third-ranking official. Baginski was coming to Los Angeles for briefings, and afterward Iden stole time with her for Miller, Williams and Grossman. She listened as they laid out the JRIC concept. “I am fully supportive of this. This is exactly what needs to happen,” Miller recalled her saying. “Let me go back and see what I can do.” Within weeks Baginski told Iden that FBI Director Robert Mueller had authorized her to make \$2.5 million available. More than that, she was offering up space adjacent to the FBI’s JDIG facility – with FBI systems running in. LAPD staff could get clearances for access, clean out sources from data, boil it down to the information so that it would not trace back to the sources, and make it available to local law enforcement.

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<sup>2</sup> Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

The arrangement suited LAPD. They put their concerns aside for the moment to assess the *real politic* of the situation. In a FBI facility, with substantial FBI funding, the FBI would have a forceful say in all matters. But they would get involved, Williams said. “That’s just the way they do business. If they’re in charge, they get involved. They come with money, they come with systems, and they come with clearances. They come with a lot of things that locals cannot produce.”

“I had to explain to Bratton that we’d gotten a better deal,” Miller said. “The FBI was not just giving us the keys to an office. They were adding what we had always judged to be the critical value, which is their classified systems and those of other government agencies. We were not going to get that at LA Clear. LA Clear would still get the intelligence they want from us – but they would lose the political impetus to drive LA Clear into a more significant counter-terrorism operation.”

Bratton assuaged the angry chiefs, meeting with them in his office to explain the decision. He assured them they would still get the intelligence they wanted from LAPD even though JRIC would be established elsewhere. But the loss of political “juice” that would have taken LA Clear to a higher profile role in the region’s counter-terrorism operations was obvious. Bratton called upon his own good standing as the first LAPD chief in generations to join the County chiefs associations to make amends. “It was his political savvy, his investment, and his contributions to that organization that made this a wrinkle instead of a disaster,” Miller commented. “A deal is a deal, but on the other hand Bratton also saw that we could get something that would function the way the region needed it to for public safety.”

Shortly after, Iden retired from the Bureau, and became State Homeland Security Director for Governor Arnold Schwarzeneger. He maneuvered to provide another \$1.5 million grant to the JRIC. The Sheriffs’ department added \$500,000.

“We woke up one day in the middle of planning and realized we now had what looked like real money,” Miller said. “We knew we were going to get our JRIC. We knew it was going to be in this space, reliant on FBI money and systems, and LA County Sheriff’s, and California and Federal Homeland Security agencies. The FBI would be a partner, but not the senior partner. All the major parties would have equal equities. We knew that we had a delicate balance to manage, because everyone was going to try and remake the JRIC in their own image.”

As vinyl has “memory,” law enforcement agencies also tend to revert to form at the first opportunity. Where Williams saw JRIC as a pure intelligence center – staffed by analysts, creating strategic products and reports, but managing no cases – the LA County Sheriff and the FBI were both ready to staff it with investigators. The Sheriff was ready to move its whole Counter-Terrorism Unit into the JRIC, or the FBI would move in

investigative squads. “That will be the end of this thing as we know it,” Williams thought, “because it will become a big detective squad, and once it becomes that, the first thing will go by the wayside is analysis, and the next is intelligence.”

LAPD insisted that no investigations run out of JRIC. Investigations – and investigators – would operate as always out of the Joint Terrorism Task Force or LAPD or LASD. JRIC would be a pure strategic analysis operation. In fact, LAPD did not want the JRIC analysts even to be in physical proximity to investigators – whether its own, the Sheriff’s Department’s, or the FBI’s – lest the analysts get pulled into cases and end up doing investigative support rather than strategic analysis. There was nothing wrong with investigative support – it drove cases, whether by cell phone analyses, or charting criminal enterprises, or analyzing wiretap data. But investigative support and strategic analysis – the fusion of data to produce “high end” products and reports – were two different disciplines, and required two different cadres.

The contention surfaced in work that began on the JRIC memorandum of understanding (MOU) that would detail the governance of the center. There were two aspects. Who would administer the center? And, how would major decisions be made?

For the one, the Sheriff’s Department was arguing that it should be run like TEW, be called TEW, and be run by the Sheriff’s people.

“LAPD didn’t agree with that at all,” said Williams, arguing instead that the FBI have overall administrative responsibility. The Bureau had funded the lease and furniture and was providing the systems and clearances. Between the Sheriff’s Department, which lacked experience in intelligence, and the FBI, which was resourcing the lion’s share of the operation, LAPD felt the choice was clear.

Concurrence emerged through successive drafts. “No matter all of this talking about partnerships,” Miller said, “somebody has to be in charge. Someone has to be its administrator.” The parties settled on the FBI.

Administration was one matter. Governance was another. No one was prepared to cede that to the FBI. The issues were complex and important. What records would be kept? How long would they be retained? How would civil rights be guarded? How would intelligence information be separated from criminal information that would be discoverable at a trial? How would the names of sources from one agency be guarded when sharing information with another? Who would have access to whose system? Could an LAPD officer walk over to the Sheriff’s computer and run a name on it? Could LAPD or Sheriff’s analysts go to the FBI’s system and run information, if they had clearances? How *would* top secret data be managed?

For the routine matters, the parties discussed rotating governance month by month. To reduce complexity, the JRIC facility created two separate physical spaces, adjoined but securely separated, one the “high side” where the top secret data was visible, where any LAPD or Sheriff’s department employee with top secret clearance could enter. It would follow established record keeping protocols. The other room was a “low side” where folks from the fire department Health Department people without clearance could operate. It seemed promising.

“Not everybody needed access to everything,” Miller observed. “The analysts did. But did the Health Department really need to know that were two sources who are being operated in a cell in Damascus? The answer is ‘no’. What the Health Department guy needs to know is there is a new chemical mixture that they are using as a poison, and do we have the antidotes for it?”

Each service brought its own system into its own desk and terminal display – the FBI, LAPD, and Sheriff’s systems did not integrate. The systems were all legacies of earlier days when departments “were kind of self-reliant,” Miller observed, and “bought systems designed for themselves before people talked a lot about interoperability.” To have integrated the systems in to a single display or terms “would be a billion dollar process, truly impossible, and a lifetime and probably beyond our reach to accomplish.” There remained local agencies who had not yet become part of the JRIC effort and whose data lay outside it.

Moreover, Gary Williams observed that there were Federal systems that would in all likelihood never connect to local systems, though the JRIC plan was for the FBI system to import data from all sources in order to determine whether any connections to be made through analysis.

But he wondered, too, whether it would ever be possible to maintain sufficient LAPD personnel with clearances. “It takes eighteen months to get a top secret clearance,” he observed. If you have a space which you must have top secret clearance to be in, without a career ladder with progressive clearances, maintaining the appropriate amount of cleared personnel is going to be extremely difficult to do.”

“What we did accomplish,” Miller said, “was we got all the systems running into one place, used an automated tool to push data to a shared data base, and we got the people sitting next to each other.”

And as Gary Williams observed, “intelligence is about relationships.”

Bratton viewed LA JRIC as a triumph of cooperation. “We had a kind of perfect storm of like-minded leadership among the entities that were going to have to get involved here,” he observed. “We are very fortunate to have had an FBI whose leaders

were consistently onboard for opening themselves up to us. We had a Sheriff who *in the 1990's* had created TEW and who initially tried to have JRIC located within his facility, but as his facility was just not structured to accommodate what we had in mind, gave up some of his share of turf consciousness. And we had leadership here at the Department that was all about willingness to put aside our parochial needs and to support this concept.”

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As the JRIC commenced its operations, questions remained regarding whether and how to scale it up and sustain it. How would the JRIC be staffed on a continuous basis? What would be the pull of traditional police work on resources that departments might initially commit to JRIC? How would the mix of classified and unclassified data be addressed so that contributors felt tangible benefits? How might technology further integrate views of data streaming from diverse systems, if at all, and reduce reliance on relationships? As it scaled up, what would be the benefits of further investment by JRIC partners, their obligations, and the issues of governance they would confront?

“It is,” said Bratton, “all about linking traditional crime analysis to terrorism analysis, and about inclusion rather than exclusion. Think ‘coordination’ rather than the lack of it – and come at it with a reduced ego. We all have great pride in our organizations. The satisfaction has to come much more from joint success rather than singular success.”