America's food safety web is not in good shape today. On the one hand it is true – 99.9% of the food we eat causes no harm. Considering our mostly decentralized farm-to-table distribution system, that's remarkable, and the mark of a well-balanced, mature sector. 

          So, what's the problem? Just ask America's tomato growers, shippers and packers, who by their own estimate lost $100 million from last summer's salmonella  episode. Just ask the FDA and state food safety officials who last summer spent tens of thousands of investigator hours tracing back the offending tomato – only to discover the culprit was, in fact, a jalapeño pepper. 

          The relationship between government regulators and the food industry has in fact quiet, syndromic, and persistent problems. It shows obvious weakness at exactly the time we need it to succeed: during outbreaks of food-borne illness. When that happens we see government and industry struggling to collaborate on a problem both have equal stakes in: assuring the safety of America's food supply and the vitality of its food markets. 

A Better Way?

          The nation's food safety web in fact sits on a high wire. It is supersensitive to the smallest tremor. It tremors all the time. Small risk creates huge consequence. 

          Proof: a few (suspected) bad tomatoes can shut down Florida and California farms, shippers, and distributors – in days, if not overnight. There is almost no resiliency, no ability to absorb the shock of a food-borne outbreak when the finger points to a particular produce. 

          And it's not going to get better. Global sourcing of food creates not small, but significant new risk vectors. Inspections are few and far between ( but will soon get better) . Still, we can't afford to shut whole segments every time China catches a cold. We can't afford to let our domestic markets be held hostage to the smallest outbreaks – whether in American-sourced produce, Mexican, or Canadian. 

          There has to be a better way. Fortunately, a few top regulators and industry leaders agree. Working with Harvard faculty and staff, they are today investigating new strategies for the traceback - the high-pressure race to trace the source of contamination back through the supply chain from the last known consumer point of contact to its source.

          Last summer, we invited these leaders to join us at Harvard. At the John F. Kennedy School of Government, that fits our mission, as articulated by Dean David T. Ellwood. We convene where we can around important public problems, assist with process and insight, work with leaders to take action, build and disseminate the knowledge that is gained. 

          Working this issue, we have found intractable problems, yes – but not unsolvable ones. We have also found a wellspring of good-will at senior most levels of industry and government – on top of anger, mistrust, and frustration – to get this fixed. 

What's the Problem? 

          In one corner: industry, in the midst of a food-borne outbreak, rich with supply chain data showing who shipped what, when and to whom, holding it close to the vest in a regulatory standoff with government, and fearful of exposing sensitive industrial information to competitors. 

          In the other corner: government, struggling to understand who might have eaten what weeks prior, lacking industry data, turning over paper invoice after invoice in an effort to trace back the contamination from the sick consumer to its source - whether a farm, a distribution center, or the retail outlet itself.

          At the moment, government and industry are both paying dearly. Tracebacks are slow and inaccurate. Data is obscure and unmanageable. Government decisions are fettered and halting. Meanwhile, industry waits while produce rots, and markets close. 

          Wouldn't it make sense for industry to help – in a salmonella outbreak, for example, rapidly illuminating its supply chains for government to see who shipped what, to whom, and when? Wouldn't it make sense for government to take advantage of that data, so that it could traceback faster, quickly exclude wide swaths of industry from suspicion, and concentrate its investigative resources on a few  non-excludable supply chain segments? 

          Yes, it would. Today, however, government and industry can't – and mostly won't. They lack the infrastructure for sharing: platforms, rules, processes or agreements; they lack trust.  And they lack a framework for mending this tear in their own fabric. 

          Now, the big retail and restaurant chains do a great job of maintaining supply chain discipline. When need be – whether in the midst of food-borne outbreak or for other purpose -- they can see their own chains in minutes. 

          However, much American produce makes its way to our tables through a smaller web of suppliers, distributors and retailers/restaurateurs. And that's where trouble really starts. If the sale does not consummate at a Red Lobster or Wal-Mart, for example, how food gets to the consumer – and most importantly, how investigators trace back from the consumer to contamination when there is an outbreak– is infinitely more varied, uncertain, and complex. 

A New Strategy for the Traceback

          Under the Harvard umbrella, government executives, produce associations, retailers, and restaurateurs are investigating a new strategy for the traceback. Its first stake in the ground is a proof-of-concept underway now. 

          The objective: see if industry can reveal its supply chains safely, securely, and in a manner government requires to take action. The goal: make the traceback investigation faster and more accurate. Exclude excludable produce sooner. Reduce the burden on industry and government from onerous record-keeping and false starts. Use existing systems and data to every extent possible. Minimize costs and investments required for success. 

          We're sharing an update with an important industry gathering this weekend at Harvard Business School – Prof. Ray A. Goldberg's annual PAPSAC meetings. For now – this is a pure leadership play, toughing out some new government-industry information-sharing arrangements and capabilities, innovating process with a technology assist from Microsoft, Tibco, and SupplyScape. 

          There is always risk- and, we believe, here also promise.

Election day, finally, in the U.S. 

By tomorrow the direction for change will be clearer. And major change is inevitable. The economic and political conditions globally will force movement that until now was "too painful" to be taken seriously.

But with serious pain inevitable, what will we do? Will we take advantage of the crisis to first understand and then create the governance we need:

• more transparent, accountable, and responsive
• more equitable and humane
• and, yes, even more efficient?

For those who are interested, we are starting a virtual meeting for the next three weeks to explore the potential and priorities for the new forms of collaboration being opened up by continuing web developments. We're seeking answers to three questions and will have a senior group of folks assembled November 20-21 to sort through our findings:

1. What new kinds of collaboration are actually taking place?
2. What problems will such collaboration be good for? NOT good for? (We're looking especially for "cross-boundary" initiatives requiring coordination among multiple institutions.)
3. What can be done to better disseminate the lessons being learned about how collaboration could be applied to the above problems?

If you'd like to participate, please reply via e-mail to be entered into the virtual meeting. Every few days for the next several weeks we'll be in touch letting you know what we've heard and seeking your views on what looks important from your perspective.

Just reply with a "yes" to this email.

All the best,

Jerry